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NOTES 
Identifying and Valuing the Injury in Lost Chance Cases 
Todd S. Aagaard 
Any plaintiff seeking to recover in tort must prove that the de­
fendant has breached the duty of care.1 Even after the plaintiff has 
established the defendant's breach of duty, however, issues of cau­
sation and damages remain.2 These two issues are frequently vex­
ing, both conceptually and in terms of evidentiary demonstration. 
For example, if a plaintiff proves that a defendant acted negligently, 
it still may be unclear whether the plaintiff would have been injured 
even ip the absence of the defendant's negligence. Similarly, in as­
sessing damages, factfinders often :find it difficult to attach a mone­
tary value to a plaintiff's nonpecuniary losses such as pain and 
suffering. 
So-called "loss of chance" cases - medical-malpractice cases in 
which a defend�t's negligence injures a plaintiff who has a pre­
existing medical condition by reducing the plaintiff's likelihood of 
recovering from the condition - pose a particularly difficult chal­
lenge to courts seeking to define the scope of and place a value on a 
defendant's liability.3 According to traditional tort doctrine, in 
such cases the plaintiff must prove that the decreased likelihood of 
recovery attributable to the defendant's negligence - as opposed 
to the preexisting condition itself - more likely than not directly 
caused her subsequent failure to recover.4 A person suffering from 
a preexisting condition with less than a fifty-percent chance of re­
covery even before diagnosis thus would have no cause of action 
against a doctor who negligently failed to diagnose the condition, 
even if the delay brought about by the missed diagnosis caused the 
person to lose a significant chance of recovering from the condi­
tion.5 For example, a person with a thirty-five percent chance of 
1. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TiiE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 
356 (5th ed. 1984) (defining the duty as "an obligation, to which the law will give recognition 
and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another"). 
2. See' id. § 41, at 263 ("An essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action for negli­
gence, or for that matter for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable connection 
between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has 
suffered."). 
3. See John D. Hodson, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: "Loss of Chance" Causality, 
54 A.L.R.411i 10, 17 (1995). 
4. See Cooper v. Hartman, 533 A.2d 1294, 1296-97 (Md. 1987). 
5. This "loss of chance" factual scenario is typical. See, e.g., DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 
N.W.2d 131(Iowa 1986); Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994). As noted above, the 
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recovering from her cancer would, according to traditional tort doc­
trine, have no cause of action against a doctor whose failure to diag­
nose the cancer caused the person's chance of survival6 to fall to 
twenty percent, or even to zero. 
On the other hand, a person with an eighty-percent initial 
chance of recovery would have a cause of action against a doctor 
whose negligent misdiagnosis reduced that chance to twenty per­
cent. In fact, under the traditional doctrine a plaintiff with an initial 
eighty-percent chance of recovery would have a cause of action 
against a doctor whose negligent misdiagnosis reduced that chance 
to anything less than sixty percent if the plaintiff subsequently 
failed to recover;7 in such a case, the doctor's negligence is more 
likely than the preexisting condition to have caused the plaintiff's 
death. The important factor is not the absolute reduction in the 
plaintiff's probability of survival, but whether the reduction that the 
preexisting condition caused exceeds the reduction that the defend­
ant's negligence caused. If this is the case, then the plaintiff cannot 
show that the defendant's negligence most likely caused the plain­
tiff's failure to recover. 
Traditional tort doctrine's total denial of compensation in cases 
in which a doctor's negligence has increased but has not more than 
doubled8 a plaintiff's likelihood of injury or death seems manifestly 
unfair. The traditional doctrine allows such a doctor to avoid any 
liability to a patient even though the doctor's failure to provide a 
timely diagnosis of the patient's malady clearly deprived the patient 
of an opportunity to recover from her condition. Courts and com­
mentators, noting the traditional doctrine's failure to fulfill the fun-
loss of chance doctrine was designed to address problems arising in medical malpractice 
cases, and its use has been limited almost exclusively to such cases. Plaintiffs' attempts to 
apply the loss of chance doctrine to analogous factual circumstances outside of the medical 
malpractice context have not been successful. See David W. Robertson, The Common Sense 
of Cause in Fact, 15 TEXAS L. REv. 1765, 1786 n.91 (1997) (citing Hardy v. Southwestern Bell 
Tel. Co., 910 P.2d 1024 (Okla. 1996) (declining to extend application of the loss of chance 
doctrine to a case involving the failure of the emergency telephone system operated by the 
defendant)). 
6. Although the paradigmatic lost chance case involves a lost chance of survival, the ulti­
mate harm in a lost chance case is not always death. See Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., 
Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 208 (Md. 1990) ("Loss of chance may include loss of chance of a positive 
or more desirable medical outcome, loss of chance of avoiding some physical injury or dis­
ease, or a loss of chance to survive."). 
7. If the plaintiff recovers from the condition, there is no cause of action under traditional 
tort law, irrespective of the magnitude of the decrease, because the plaintiff would be unable 
to show damages resulting from the defendant's negligence. Cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 731 (5th ed. 1990) ("Proof of damages is an essential 
element of the plaintiff's case in most civil litigation."). 
8. If the doctor's negligent misdiagnosis of the plaintiff's condition more than doubles the 
plaintiff's likelihood of suffering injury or death, then the plaintiff may recover under the 
traditional doctrine. In such a case, the doctor's negligence, rather than the preexisting con­
dition itself, is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury or death. 
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damental tort goals of deterrence and compensation in these types 
of lost chance cases,9 developed what is known as the loss of chance 
doctrine in response.10 The loss of chance doctrine addresses the 
perceived injustice of the traditional doctrine by recognizing a po­
tential cause of action in any case in which the defendant's negli­
gent conduct decreased the plaintiff's chance of recovery from a 
preexisting condition. Thus, the loss of chance doctrine gives a 
cause of action to the hypothetical plaintiff whose doctor's negli­
gence decreased her likelihood of survival from thirty-five percent 
to twenty percent. 
Although advocates of the doctrine agree that lost chance cases 
demand compensation, they disagree as to the theoretical basis for 
allowing lost chance claims to proceed.11 Disagreement about the 
nature of the compensable injury in a lost chance case spills over 
into confusion about how to value that injury. Unfortunately, the 
considerable attention that the loss of chance doctrine has gener­
ated among academic commentators12 and in the courtsl3 has 
9. See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 486 (Wash. 1983) (Pearson, J., 
concurring) (arguing that awarding damages for the lost opportunity to recover promotes the 
deterrence objective); Beth Clemens Boggs, Lost Chance of Survival Doctrine: Should the 
Courts Ever Tmker with Chance?, 16 S. Iu.. U. LJ. 421, 4;40-44 (1992) (evaluating the effec­
tiveness of various approaches to loss of chance cases in meeting the deterrence and compen­
sation objectives); Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury 
Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE LJ. 1353, 1377 
(1981) (arguing that denying compensation in such cases "subverts the deterrence objectives 
of tort law by denying recovery for the effects of conduct that causes statistically demonstra­
ble losses"). 
10. Observers commonly trace the origin of the loss of chance doctrine to Professor 
King's widely cited 1981 article promoting its adoption. See generally King, supra note 9. In 
fact, Professor King drew many of his ideas from a 1978 article in the Personal Injury Annual 
See Leon L. Wolfstone & Thomas J. Wolfstone, Recovery of Damages for the Loss of a 
Chance, in PERSONAL INJURY .ANNuAL -1978, at 744 (1978). Since the landmark Washing­
ton Supreme Court case of Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 
1983), the majority of courts that have considered the issue of whether to adopt the loss of 
chance doctrine have decided to allow claims for a lost chance of survival. See Hodson, supra 
note 3, at 34-48 (listing 24 states as having adopted the doctrine, 12 as having rejected the 
doctrine, and 4 as having conflicting case law on the issue); see also Robert A. Reisig, Jr., 
Note, The Loss of a Chance Theory in Medical Malpractice Cases: An Overview, 13 AM. J. 
TRIAL Aovoc. 1163, 1170 (1990) (citing cases from state courts in 20 states and federal 
courts in 5 additional states in which courts adopted the doctrine). But see Bryson B. Moore, 
Note, South Carolina Rejects the Lost Chance Doctrine, 48 S.C. L. REv. 201, app. A at 216-18 
(1996) (classifying 16 states as having adopted some form of the doctrine and 18 as not 
adopting the doctrine). 
11. See infra notes 18-27 and accompanying text (discussing the "causation approach" 
and "damages approach" to the doctrine). 
12. See, e.g., Boggs, supra note 9; King, supra note 9; Vern R. Walker, Direct Inference in 
the Lost Chance Cases: Factfinding Constraints Under Minimal Fairness to Parties, 23 
HOFSTRA L. REv. 247 (1994); Moore, supra note 10. 
13. Compare, e.g., Waffen v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 799 F.2d 911 
(4th Cir. 1986) (holding that Maryland law recognizes a cause of action for loss of chance) 
and Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990) (recognizing a loss of chance 
doctrine under Michigan law) and McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P .2d 467 (Okla. 
1987) (recognizing a loss of chance doctrine under Oklahoma law) with, e.g., Dumas v. 
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served only to perpetuate rather than alleviate this doctrinal confu­
sion. These courts and commentators have focused almost exclu­
sively on the issue of whether jurisdictions should adopt the lost 
chance doctrine, 14 while largely ignoring the equally important is­
sue of how courts in jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine 
should determine the appropriate compensation in a particular 
case.15 Proponents of the doctrine have proffered arguments for 
why the law should compensate plaintiffs in lost chance cases with­
out addressing what the compensation should be. 
For example, proponents argue that denying compensation to 
plaintiffs in lost chance cases would allow tortfeasors to avoid re­
sponsibility for the consequences of their tortious conduct.16 With­
out further elaboration as to the injury being compensated, 
however, this argument begs the question it purports to answer. 
That is, negligent conduct is not always tortious conduct; an act gives 
rise to liability only to the extent that it causes an injury.17 Until 
proponents of the loss of chance doctrine identify the injury suf­
fered as a result of the negligent conduct, it is not at all clear that 
the defendant has in fact "avoided" liability for her conduct, be­
cause it is not clear that such conduct was tortious. 
This Note seeks to define precisely the tort i.Iljury in lost chance 
cases and to ascertain the proper method for measuring the dam­
ages associated with that inj'!1fY. Part I defines the types of losses 
that constitute the tort injury in lost chance cases and argues that 
Cooney, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584 (Ct. App. 1991) (refusing to recognize a loss of chance doctrine 
under California law) and Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 
1984) (refusing to recognize a loss of chance doctrine under Florida law). 
14. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 9, 12, & 13. 
15. See Smith v. State Dept. of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 547 n.8 (La. 1996) 
("While the loss of a chance of survival doctrine has spawned a plethora of commentary and 
has been recognized by a majority of the states, little attention has been given to the complex 
issue we focus on today of the appropriate methodology for calculating the value of the loss 
of a chance of survival." (citations omitted)); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 136, 173 (1992) ("Many of the courts that presently do allow [recovery for loss of 
chance] are vague or silent about the nature of the value that is lost, and simply rely on prior 
precedents as justification. "). 
In a sense, this Note inverts the standard analysis of the loss of chance doctrine by identi­
fying the cognizable injury in lost chance cases and determining how it should be compen­
sated without first inquiring whether it should be compensated. This Note does not address 
directly the latter question of whether courts should adopt the loss of chance doctrine. Yet 
insofar as it demonstrates that the compensable injury in a lost chance case is cognizable 
under the same principles of causation as are employed in a traditional tort case, see infra 
section I.A, this Note's analysis arguably obviates the need to justify further the compensa­
tion of lost chance claims. Cf. 1 DAN B. DoBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.7, at 28 (2d ed. 1993) 
("The [traditional] scheme of analysis ... works when we have a clear conception of the 
plaintiff's right and want to know what the remedy is. Sometimes, however, the process is 
reversed and we know what the right is only because we see it exemplified in the remedy."). 
16. See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 477 (Wash. 1983); Wolfstone & 
Wolfstone, supra note 10, at 762. 
17. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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courts have, for the most part, failed to identify these losses prop­
erly. For this reason, they have failed to measure damages in a way 
that accurately compensates for these losses. Part II advocates a 
method of damages determination that relies on direct assessment 
of the tort injury by the factfinder, informed by a clear understand­
ing of the distinct tort injury at issue and by the guidance tradition­
ally offered by the judge's instructions, In advancing such a 
formulation, Part II criticizes two alternative methods of damage 
valuation. This Note concludes that the loss of chance doctrine can 
achieve legitimacy as a valid extension - rather than an ill-fitting 
alteration - of traditional principles of tort law only by defining in 
precise terms the losses that constitute the tort injury in lost ch�ce 
cases and by allowing juries the discretion to assess the value of 
those losses without undue constraints. 
I. CONCEPTUALIZING THE TORT INJURY IN 
LOST CHANCE CASES 
Neither judges nor juries can accurately measure damages in 
lost chance cases without an adequate conceptualization of the pre­
cise nature of the injury they are compensating. A judge must have 
a clear vision of the nature of the injury so that she can rule on 
evidentiary matters, properly instruct the jury in its deliberations, 
and subsequently evaluate the validity of the jury's verdict. A jury 
must understand thoroughly the nature of the injury if it is to deter­
mine accurately whether the injury has occurred and, if it finds that 
such injury has occurred, to measure accurately the loss that the 
plaintiff has suffered. 
This Part conceptualizes the harrp. suffered in a lost chance case 
in order to enable the development of a framework for measuring 
the damages associated with such harm. Section I.A addresses the 
antecedent issue of distinguishing the compensable losses from the 
noncompensable losses - an area of particular confusion to courts 
and commentators. It concludes that the plaintiff's tort "injury" in 
a lost chance case is actually an amalgamation of losses, all directly 
related to the plaintiff's deprivation of an opportunity for a better 
result. Section I.B identifies the types of compensable losses that 
arise in lost chance cases and describes the case-specific, fact­
intensive inquiry necessary to identify, first, which of these losses 
are present and, second, which of the losses that are present have 
occurred as a consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct -
which of these harms make up the tort injury in a given case. 
A. Distinguishing the Tort Injury from the Underlying Injury 
The coexistence of multiple injuries - some of which the de­
fendant's negligence proximately caused and some of which are at-
1340 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1335 
tributable to the preexisting condition - makes identification of 
the lost chance tort injury particularly difficult. The fact that courts 
have adopted two competing premises for compensating lost chance 
plaintiffs - the causation approach and the damages approach -
further confuses this task, because a court's rationale for compen­
sating lost chance plaintiffs affects how it conceptualizes the plain­
tiff's tort injury. This section argues that the damages approach 
properly focuses on those portions of the plaintiff's losses that the 
defendant's negligence proximately caused. It then distinguishes 
these losses from the losses resulting from the underlying condition 
and asserts that only the former constitute the compensable tort 
injury in lost chance cases. 
The loss of chance doctrine represents a departure from tradi­
tional tort doctrine.18 There has been considerable dispute, how­
ever, as to the precise nature and extent of this departure. Because 
the loss of chance doctrine allows a legal claim in cases in which the 
plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant more likely than not 
caused the plaintiff's ultimate failure to recover, some courts and 
commentators conceptualize the doctrine as an exception to the 
"basic rule of legal cause," which holds that "[a] negligent actor is 
legally responsible for that harm, and only that harm, of which his 
negligence is a cause in fact."19 Courts employing this causation 
approach20 to the loss of chance doctrine award compensation to 
lost chance plaintiffs on the ground that the lost chance factual sce­
nario necessitates a relaxation of the traditional requirement of 
proximate causation.21 In other words, adherents of the causation 
approach sacrifice tort law's usual means of establishing liability -
the demonstration of a clear causal nexus between negligent act and 
harmful result - in order to vindicate fairness values.22 
An alternative approach to the doctrine, the damages ap­
proach,23 conceives of the loss of chance doctrine differently, and in 
doing so avoids the need to carve out an exception from the tradi­
tional causation standard. According to the damages approach, the 
loss of chance cause of action does not depend on a relaxation of 
18. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text 
19. RoBERT E. KEEToN, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF ToRTS 4 {1963) (emphasis 
omitted). 
20. See Cooper v. Hartman, 533 A.2d 1294, 1297 (Md. 1987). 
21. See Robert S. Bruer, Note, Loss of a Chance as a Cause of Action in Medical Mal­
practice Cases: Wollen v. DePaul Health Center, 59 Mo . L. REv. 969, 983 (1994); Reisig, 
supra note 10, at 1171. 
22. In awarding compensation for the plaintiff's entire loss, the causation approach suc­
cessfully avoids the difficult issues involved in valuing the tort injury -but only by over­
extending the scope of the defendant's liability to reach losses that the defendant's 
negligence did not cause. See infra text accompanying notes 71-74 (criticizing the practice of 
awarding full damages in loss of chance cases). 
23. See Hartman, 533 A.2d at 1297. 
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the causation standard, but on a clarification of the injury for which 
the plaintiff seeks compensation.24 Courts adopting tlris approach 
hold that the plaintiff may sue only for the harms specifically attrib­
utable to her lost chance of recovering from the condition, and not 
for the harms that were as likely, or more likely, caused by the con­
dition itself.25 This separate cognizable injury is distinct from the 
plaintiff's ultimate failure to recover,26 for which the preexisting 
condition is by definition the legal cause in a case involving the loss 
of chance doctrine.21 
Lost chance cases thus involve two injuries:28 the underlying in­
jury29 caused by the preexisting condition and the tort injury caused 
by the loss of a chance to recover from the preexisting condition. 30 
The coexistence of these two distinct, yet closely related, injuries 
exacerbates the difficulty of the court's task beyond that of the typi­
cal negligence case. Courts in these cases must distinguish carefully 
the losses associated with the tort injury from the losses associated 
with the plaintiff's underlying injury.31 This distinction, however, 
eludes many courts.32 
24. See 533 A.2d at 1297. 
25. See 533 A.2d at 1297. 
26. See Reisig, supra note 10, at 1170-71. 
27. See Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 52 (Mich. 1990); Herskovits v. Group 
Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 481 (Wash. 1983) (Pearson, J., concurring). 
28. The underlying injury is always present in cases to which the loss of chance doctrine 
applies; the plaintiff alleges, but may or may not be able to prove in a particular case, also to 
have suffered the tort injury. 
29. In addition to the ultimate harm, see infra text accompanying note 33, of which the 
preexisting condition is the clear but-for cause, the underlying injury consists of a set of 
physical, emotional, and consequential damages separate from those caused by the loss of 
chance, cf. infra note 43 (discussing the physical, emotional, and consequential losses associ­
ated with the lost chance). The set of injuries that the preexisting condition caused are not 
compensable, while the set of injuries that the loss of chance caused are compensable. 
30. Al; noted above, although the loss of chance potentially also bears some causal rela­
tion to the plaintiff's ultimate failure to recover, by definition, the lost chance is not a but-for 
- a more-likely-than-not - cause of her failure to recover; otherwise, the case would be a 
straightforward tort claim. Even so, most courts identify the tort injury in terms of its poten­
tial relationship to the failure to recover. See, e.g., infra note 76 (criticizing the proportional 
valuation method of damages assessment as making such a mistake). Al; the balance of this 
section argues, that nebulous relationship need not and should not be the basis for compensa­
tion in a lost chance case. Rather, courts should compensate lost chance plaintiffs for a loss 
solely on the same basis as in any other tort case - the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate, first, 
that the plaintiff has suffered the loss and, second, that the defendant's negligence proxi­
mately caused the Joss. 
31. See Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 186 (Kan. 1994) ("[T]he damages recoverable [in 
a lost chance case] should be limited to the amount attributable to the lost or reduced chance 
itself and not the total damages, which would include those resulting from the preexisting 
condition."); see also Levit, supra note 15, at 155 (observing that the central premise of the 
Joss of chance doctrine is that "[c]ourts permit plaintiffs to sue for the lost possibility of 
improvement, rather than for the defendant's contribution to or enhancement of the plain­
tiff's illness or injury"). 
32. For example, some courts award plaintiffs in lost chance cases the full value of the 
losses that both injuries caused, rather than limiting the damages award to the loss that the 
1342 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 96:1335 
Just as with any other tort case, the tort injury in a lost chance 
case is the set of harms for which the plaintiff can show that the 
defendant's negligence was a but-for cause. This injury does not 
include compensating for the possibility that the defendant's negli­
gence caused the ultimate harm - usually, but not always, death33 
- resulting from the plaintiff's failure to recover. The fact that 
both the preexisting condition and the lost chance of recovery may 
have contributed to a plaintiff's failure to recover does not logically 
entail that the underlying injury and the tort injury are indistin­
guishable. The fact that multiple potential causes - including the 
defendant's negligence - may exist for those harms associated with 
the underlying injury does not mean that the usual, straightforward, 
"more likely than not" test for causation should not apply. Neither 
does it provide an excuse for courts to aggregate all the plaintiff's 
harms and apportion liability based on some overall percentage 
likelihood of causation.34 
Many courts obscure the distinction between the tort injury and 
the ultimate harm by requiring that the plaintiff must actually have 
suffered the ultimate harm before seeking damages for the loss of 
the chance of recovery.35 These courts worry that if the tort injury 
is truly distinct from the underlying injury, then no principled basis 
appears to exist for limiting liability to those cases in which the pre­
existing condition develops into physical loss; the chance has been 
lost regardless of whether the plaintiff recovers from the preexisting 
condition. In the course of an opinion declining to adopt the loss of 
chance doctrine, the Maryland Court of Appeals noted this prob­
lem: "If courts are going to allow damages solely for the loss of 
chance of survival, logically there ought to be recovery for loss of 
chance regardless of whether the patient succumbs to the unrelated 
pre-existing medical problem or miraculously recovers despite the 
lost probability of recovery caused. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp. , 688 
P.2d 605, 615-16 (Ariz. 1984); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp. , 357 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510-11 
(App. Div. 1974), affd., 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975); see also infra text accompanying notes 71-74 
(criticizing this approach). The causation approach to the loss of chance doctrine perpetuates 
this problem by framing the loss of chance simply as an exception to conventional principles 
of causation. The damages approach, on the other hand, properly distinguishes between the 
tort injury and the underlying injury. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text (discuss­
ing the causation and damages approaches). This Note therefore advocates the damages 
approach. 
Even among those courts that purport to recognize the distinction between the tort injury 
and the underlying injury, many that apply the proportional valuation method do so in a way 
that exhibits a failure to discriminate adequately between the two injuries. See infra text 
accompanying notes 75-79. 
33. See supra note 6 (noting the possibility of ultimate harms other than death). 
34. Cf. infra section Il.A (criticizing the proportional valuation method of assessing dam­
ages in lost chance cases for taking such an approach). 
35. See Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 213 (Md. 1990) ("Loss of 
chance of survival in itself is not compensable unless and until death ensues."). 
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negligence and unfavorable odds."36 Based on this perceived fun­
damental weakness in the doctrine -its apparent application even 
in cases in which the plaintiff experiences no ultimate harm -these 
courts deny any compensation in lost chance cases. 
In doing so, these courts commit precisely the conceptual error 
noted above. They fail to recognize that the reduced probability of 
recovering from the preexisting condition - the lost chance itself 
-is not the tort injury. Rather, the tort injury in a lost chance case 
is the set of harms that proximately result from the loss of the 
chance. The lost chance plaintiff's claim to damages for a tort in­
jury therefore is contingent not just on her lost chance of survival 
but also on her ability to show damages resulting from the loss of 
the chance.37 The plaintiff's ability to show damages will hinge on 
the occurrence of the ultimate harm - her ultimate recovery or 
failure to recover from the preexisting condition - only to the ex­
tent, if any, that it reflects the existence or nonexistence of these 
losses. 
If the plaintiff has suffered no ultimate harm, the claim is not a 
claim under the lost chance doctrine but a typical medical malprac­
tice claim. For example, a plaintiff may well recover from the pre­
existing condition but require additional medical care, or 
experience additional pain due to her doctor's negligently delayed 
diagnosis. Such a plaintiff has suffered no ultimate harm but clearly 
has suffered a tort injury. Indeed, this tort injury resembles the in­
jury in a conventional medical malpractice case. 
Yet, an opponent might argue, if the lost chance doctrine does 
not limit liability to cases in which the mere likelihood that the 
plaintiff will fail to recover develops into an actual failure to re­
cover, then the doctrine threatens to become indistinguishable from 
a claim for compensation for an as-yet unmanifested injury. Courts 
have looked upon such risk-based compensation claims with consid­
erably less favor than the loss of chance doctrine.38 They have re­
fused to recognize a cause of action for increased risk primarily on 
the ground that the law can best compensate plaintiffs facing possi­
ble future harm by waiting to see if the harm materializes and then 
allowing the plaintiff to bring a claim if and when the harm does 
36. Fennel� 580 A.2d at 213. 
37. Cf. infra section I.B (describing the physical, emotional, and consequential losses that 
the lost chance can cause). 
38. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 15, § 8.1(7), at 410 (noting that courts usually have denied 
compensation to plaintiffs pursuing claims for enhanced risk); Terry Morehead Dworkin, 
Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 53 
FORDHAM L. RE.v. 527, 527 (1984) (same); Fournier J. Gale m & James L. Goyer m, Recov­
ery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 CuMB. L. RE.v. 723, 736-41 (1985) 
(same). Unlike the increased-risk claim, which looks to the possibility of future injury, the 
loss of chance claim is based entirely on an injury that has already occurred. 
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materialize.39 No such future cause of action, however, is available 
to the plaintiff asserting a loss of chance claim. The loss of chance 
doctrine does not enable a plaintiff to sue based on the chance of 
incurring a future ultimate harm; she will not have a cause of action 
based on the ultimate harm even after it occurs. Unlike the 
increased-risk claim, which seeks compensation for the possibility 
that an as-yet unmanifested injury will occur in the future, the harm 
in a lost chance case already has materialized; all the losses that the 
lost chance plaintiff will suffer either have occurred or will occur by 
the time the case comes before a court.40 
In sum, every loss of chance case involves a defendant whose 
negligent behavior increased the likelihood that a plaintiff suffering 
from some preexisting condition would fail to recover from the con­
dition - that is, would suffer some ultimate harm. The loss of 
chance doctrine applies to those cases in which the plaintiff suffers 
the ultimate harm but cannot show that the defendant's negligence 
- as opposed to the preexisting condition - was the proximate 
cause of the ultimate harm. The ultimate harm is therefore ancil­
lary to the plaintiff's claim for compensation. But whether or not 
the plaintiff has suffered the ultimate harm, the defendant's negli­
gence may have caused other losses for the plaintiff. It is these 
losses, for which the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant's 
negligence was the proximate cause, that form the tort injury. 
B. Identifying the Consequences of the Defendant's Negligence 
A defendant doctor whose negligent misdiagnosis deprives a 
plaintiff of a chance to recover from a preexisting condition poten­
tially has caused several different types of compensable harms. Five 
categories of harm potentially occur in a lost chance case: the ulti­
mate harm, the lost chance of survival itself, increased physical pain 
and other physical losses,41 emotional losses, and consequential 
damages such as additional medical costs.42 A prevailing plaintiff in 
a case invoking the lost chance doctrine by definition has suffered 
from the first two types of injury - the ultimate harm and the lost 
chance - but neither of these injuries is compensable.43 Some 
39. See 2 DoBBs, supra note 15, § 8.1(7), at 410. 
40. See id. 
41. For example, a doctor's failure to diagnose or treat a patient's breast cancer in a 
timely manner may result in progression of the cancer to the point where a mastectomy 
rather than radiation therapy is needed to treat the cancer. 
42. See Allen E. Shoenberger, Medical Malpractice Injury: Causation and Valuation of 
the Loss of a Chance to Survive, 6 J. LEGAL MEo. 51, 69 (1985). 
43. As previously discussed, the ultimate harm is not compensable under a loss of chance 
claim. See supra section I.A. This Note takes the position that the lost chance also is not 
compensable in and of itself; courts should compensate only the identifiable loss to the plain­
tiff caused by the lost chance, rather than the lost chance itself. Cf. Werner v. Blankfort, 42 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 234-36 (Ct. App. 1995) (distinguishing between lost chance cases that do 
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combination of the remaining three categories of losses forms the 
tort injury in a particular lost chance case. 
At its core, the task of identifying the tort injury in a lost chance 
case therefore involves determining, first, which of these types of 
loss the plaintiff has suffered and, second, which of these demon­
strated losses the defendant's negligence proximately caused. This 
requires a highly case-specific and fact-intensive inquiry.44 The 
opinions in two cases, James v. United States4s and Evers v. 
Dollinger, 46 illustrate quite effectively the three categories of loss 
suffered in typical lost chance cases - physical, emotional, and con­
sequential - and how these losses are distinct from the underlying 
injury. James and Evers exemplify the careful analysis that courts 
applying the lost chance doctrine must adopt; they stand in marked 
contrast to the muddled and truncated analyses that dominate most 
judicial examinations of tort injury.47 The two cases involved very 
similar factual scenarios. The plaintiffs, William James and Merle 
Evers, both received medical examinations from doctors who negli­
gently failed to discover cancerous tumors developing inside their 
bodies, thus delaying medical treatment to treat the tumors.48 
not seek direct compensation for the lost chance of recovery, which are cognizable under 
"established principles of causation," and those that seek direct compensation for the lost 
chance). These losses will fall into one of the three remaining categories of injury - physi­
cal, emotional, or consequential. 
44. See Shoenberger, supra note 42, at 69 (asserting that proper analysis of a lost chance 
case requires "finer discrimination with respect to causation, allowing close examination of 
the question, 'causation of what?' "). Although any tort case involves a case-specific inquiry 
into the facts of the case, the need for such an inquiry is particularly acute in the lost chance 
context, in which the coexistence of, and close relationship between, the compensable tort 
injury and the preexisting condition exacerbate the difficulty of the factfinder's causation 
inquiry. 
45. 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 
46. 471 A.2d 405 (NJ. 1984). 
47. See, e.g., Mays v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476, 1482-83 (D. Colo. 1985) (applying, 
without explanation, the proportional valuation method to the net pecuniary losses suffered 
by the plaintiff but not to damages arising out of loss of consortium, although both similarly 
arose out of the death of plaintiff's decedent); Polischeck v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 1261, 
1266 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (applying proportional valuation to adjust the life expectancy, rather 
than to determine the overall damages - much less the particular damages resulting from 
the loss of chance - of the plaintiff's decedent); Gordon v. Willis Knighton Med. Ctr., 661 
So. 2d 991, 1000-01 (La. Ct App. 1995) (applying the loss of chance doctrine even after 
noting that the evidence established that the defendant's negligence more likely than not 
killed the plaintiff's decedent). 
48. The federal district court in James applied California law to a Federal Tort Claims Act 
action arising out of a negligently delayed cancer diagnosis. Due to a clerical error, the pre­
employment physical examination of James, a naval shipyard worker, failed to identify that 
James was suffering from lung cancer. Approximately two years later, after James began 
experiencing chest pains, shortness of breath, and coughing, his personal physician discov­
ered the tumor in his lung. By this time, however, the tumor had become inoperable. After 
radiation therapy, James's cancer went into remission. See 483 F. Supp. at 583. According to 
James's experts, the government's negligent failure to diagnose his lung cancer resulted in a 
10-15% reduction in his probability of surviving five years. See 483 F. Supp. at 585. It ap-
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Both James and Evers claimed physical losses as components of 
their lost chance injuries. The James court conceptualized James's 
physical loss as "the loss of the opportunity for earlier and possibly 
more effective treatment."49 The Evers court similarly described 
the physical aspect of Evers's tort injury, which involved the exacer­
bation of her cancer due to Dr. Dollinger's failure to diagnose and 
commence treatment: "As a proximate result of [the defendant's 
negligence], the tumor not only remained in her body, it grew in 
size. Plaintiff was unquestionably more seriously diseased as a re­
sult of the growth of the malignancy."50 Both courts thus correctly 
limited the plaintiff's compensation for physical loss to the physical 
harm that the exacerbation of the preexisting condition caused 
rather than the physical harm that the preexisting condition itself 
caused. 
James and Evers also both claimed that their delayed diagnoses 
caused them emotional pain and suffering. The James court de­
scribed "the mental anguish from the awareness of th[ e] lost oppor­
tunity," the damages for which were to be offset by "the 
psychological benefit from not having known of his cancer [for the 
two years prior to the delayed diagnosis]."51 The Evers court noted 
the "anxiety, emotional anguish and mental distress"52 caused by 
the defendant's negligent failure to diagnose Evers's cancer and 
found that "[d]amages for Mrs. Evers'[s] emotional and mental suf­
fering should be awarded upon proof that this distress resulted from 
defendant's negligent failure to diagnose her tumor and effectuate 
prompt and proper treatment."53 As the Evers court was careful to 
note, the mental suffering caused by the preexisting condition -
which was not compensable and not part of the tort injury - must 
be distinguished from the mental suffering caused specifically by 
the plaintiff's knowledge "that defendant's delay in her treatment 
pears from the opinion that James's cancer had become conclusively terminal at the time the 
court decided the case. 
Evers arose out of the delayed diagnosis of Evers's breast cancer. Evers had visited the 
defendant, Dr. Kenneth Dollinger, after feeling a small lump in her breast. Dollinger assured 
Evers that the lump was not of concern. See 471 A.2d at 407. After noticing that the lump 
was increasing in size and growing increasingly painful, Evers again visited Dr. Dollinger's 
office but again was told that the lump was not cancerous. See 471 A.2d at 407. Unsatisfied 
with the diagnosis, Evers consulted another doctor, who diagnosed her breast cancer and 
performed a mastectomy. See 471 A.2d at 407. Evers's cancer was subsequently found to 
have spread to her lungs and become terminal. See 471 A.2d at 407-08. 
49. James, 483 F. Supp. at 587. 
50. Evers, 471 A.2d at 410 (footnotes omitted). 
51. James, 483 F. Supp. at 587-88. 
52. Evers, 471 A.2d at 410. 
53. Eyers, 471 A.2d at 411. 
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had increased the risk that she would again fall victim, perhaps fa­
tally, to the disease," which was compensable.s4 
With respect to the third type of loss, consequential harm, Evers 
was more successful in obtaining damages than was James. Evers 
alleged that the defendant's negligently delayed diagnosis had re­
sulted in additional medical costs.ss In analyzing Evers's claim, the 
Evers court was careful to exclude the medical costs that would 
have occurred even in the absence of Dr. Dollinger's negligence, 
noting that Evers had not claimed "that absent the seven months 
delay in diagnosis the mastectomy would not have been re­
quired. "S6 Because Evers's cancer would have required a mastec­
tomy even if the defendant had not failed to diagnose it during his 
examinations of Evers, Evers had no claim for the medical expenses 
or physical pain and suffering resulting from the mastectomy. 
James, on the other hand, did not claim additional medical ex­
penses, but he did ask for other consequential damages. The James 
court, however, properly refused to award James damages for lost 
earnings from his employment or to award his wife damages for loss 
of support and loss of consortium, as it found that the underlying 
cancer, rather than the exacerbation of James's condition due to the 
government's delayed diagnosis, caused those elements of the 
James' loss.s7 
In sum, the losses that comprise the tort injury in a lost chance 
case fall into three broad categories: physical, emotional, and con­
sequential. Identifying the tort injury requires the factfinder not 
only to ascertain what losses the plaintiff has suffered, but also to 
exclude carefully the losses associated with the underlying injury 
rather than the tort injury. As James and Evers demonstrate, the 
lost chance tort injury may involve different sets of losses even in 
similar cases. Identification of the tort injury thus necessitates care­
ful case-by-case analysis. 
II. VALUING DAMAGES TO COMPENSATE THE LOST 
CHANCE TORT INJURY 
Identification of the tort injury is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
step in the process of clarifying the loss of chance doctrine's appli­
cation; the doctrine must also articulate a method for translating 
the identified injury into monetary damages. Professor King de­
fined valuation as "the process of identifying and measuring the loss 
54. Evers, 471 A.2d at 409. Not surprisingly, Evers testified at trial that she carried "an-
ger and hostility towards defendant after her tumor was finally diagnosed." 471 A.2d at 411. 
55. See Evers, 471 A.2d at 408. 
56. Evers, 471 A.2d at 408. 
57. See James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 588 (N.D. Cal. 1980). The court did not 
articulate the basis for this finding. 
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that was cause& by the tortious conduct."58 Nonpecuniary losses 
such as those involved in a loss of chance injury are notoriously 
difficult to measure.59 Furthermore, because the loss suffered in a 
lost chance case is conceptually more complex than the standard 
tort injury, "[t]he acceptance of the loss of a chance theory raises 
unique issues in the area of damage recovery."60 To state what may 
- or should - be obvious, the key criterion in choosing a method 
of valuing the tort injury must be the degree to which the result 
obtained by applying the valuation method corresponds with the 
actual loss caused by the injury to be compensated. 61 
Courts have followed three distinct approaches to valuing dam­
ages in lost chance cases.62 The discretionary valuation method 
gives the factfinder discretion to assess damages based on its evalu­
ation of all the relevant evidence. 63 Courts applying discretionary 
58. King, supra note 9, at 1354. 
59. See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping 
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REv. 773, 778-79 (1995) 
("The problem is that there is no obvious relationship between money and a nonmonetary 
injury. Consequently, different ways of conceptualizing how these damages should be deter· 
mined could yield significantly different damages awards."). 
60. Reisig, supra note 10, at 1182. 
The persistence of the fundamentally flawed causation approach to the doctrine, see supra 
notes 18-27 and accompanying text, further increases the difficulty of correctly valuing the 
tort injury in lost chance cases. Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hospital, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510-11 
(App. Div. 1974), affd., 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975), aptly illustrates how a court's conceptualiza· 
tion of the tort injury can affect how it decides to value the plaintiff's loss. In Kallenberg, the 
defendant hospital's staff negligently failed to administer a drug needed to reduce the plain· 
tiff's blood pressure that would have allowed her to be operated upon for a cerebral aneu­
rysm. See 357 N.Y.S.2d at 509. According to the plaintiff's expert, had the defendants 
administered the medication to Kallenberg and subsequently operated upon her, she would 
have had a 20-40% chance of survival. See 357 N.Y.S.2d at 510. Adopting the causation 
approach, the court held that the lost chance of survival was sufficient to allow the jury to 
find that the hospital's negligence had caused Kallenberg's death. See 357 N.Y.S.2d at 511. 
The Kallenberg court conceptualized Kallenberg's lost chance of survival as an issue of proof 
of proximate causation in a wrongful death action, rather than as an injury distinct from her 
death. Because Kallenberg had only a 20-40% chance of survival even in the absence of the 
defendant hospital's negligence, the hospital's negligence was not a but-for cause of 
Kallenberg's death, and the hospital therefore should not have been held liable for a full 
wrongful death award. In awarding damages to compensate for Kallenberg's ultimate harm, 
the court violated the fundamental principle of causation in tort law by extending the defend· 
ant's liability beyond the injury resulting from its negligence. See supra note 19 and accom­
panying text. As a result, the court upheld the jury's damages award for the full value of 
Kallenberg's ultimate harm - in this case, her death. 
61. Judge McAuliffe of the Maryland Court of Appeals, concurring in Fennell v. Southern 
Maryland Hospital Center, Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 216 (Md. 1990) (McAuliffe, J., concurring), 
cogently identified the objective of the process of evaluating damages in lost chance cases: 
"[R]ecovery should be based on recognition that deprivation of a substantial chance of sur· 
viva! is, in itself, a loss that can be valued and compensated. The damages that should be 
allowed ought to, as closely as possible, match the value of what has been lost." 
62. See Borgren v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 581, 582 (D. Kan. 1989); Boody v. United 
States, 706 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (D. Kan. 1989); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 
(Iowa 1986); King, supra note 9, at 1381-82. 
63. See, e.g., Borgren, 723 F. Supp. at 582; James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 586 
(N.D. Cal. 1980); DeBurkarte, 393 N.W.2d at 137. In a recent opinion in which it adopted the 
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valuation guide the factfinder's inquiry with instructions that iden­
tify the nature of the tort injury in a lost chance case and that em­
phasize the proof of causation required for each loss for which the 
plaintiff is to be compensated.64 Proportional valuation, the 
method that the majority of courts have adopted, values lost chance 
damages by multiplying the percentage reduction in the chance of 
recovery by the total value of the loss the plaintiff suffered - the 
tort injury and the underlying injury combined.65 Proportional val­
uation thus limits the fact:finder's role in valuing damages to deter­
mining the percentage reduction in the plaintiff's chance of 
recovery and the value of the plaintiff's total loss. The full damages 
approach awards damages to lost chance plaintiffs for all of their 
losses, whether caused by the preexisting condition or by the lost 
chance, and without regard to the magnitude of the reduction in 
probability of recovery that the defendant's negligence caused.66 
This Part argues that the discretionary valuation method is the 
most accurate and precise of these three approaches in assessing the 
discretionary method, the Louisiana Supreme Court described the nature of the inquiry to be 
undertaken by a factfinder applying discretionary valuation: 
Evidence of loss of support, loss of love and affection and other wrongful death damages 
is relevant, but not mathematically determinative, in loss of a chance of survival cases, as 
is evidence of the percentage chance of survival at the time of the malpractice. The 
plaintiff may also present evidence of, and argue, other factors to the jury, such as that a 
ten percent chance of survival may be more significant when reduced from ten percent 
to zero than when reduced from forty to thirty percent. The jury may also consider such 
factors as that the victim, although not likely to survive, would have lived longer but for 
the malpractice. 
Smith v. State Dept. of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 n.10 (La. 1996). 
64. Effective jury instructions implementing the discretionary valuation approach there­
fore should instruct the jury to award damages only for those physical, emotional, and conse­
quential losses that the plaintiff has shown to have proximately resulted from the defendant's 
negligently delayed diagnosis. The instructions should remind the jury carefully to segregate 
the underlying and tort injuries and to deny compensation for any losses that the plaintiff's 
preexisting condition, rather than the defendant's negligence, caused. 
65. See, e.g., Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 187 (Kan. 1994); Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 
462 N.W.2d 44, 52-57 (Mich. 1990); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 476-
77 {Okla. 1987); see also Reisig, supra note 10, at 1184. The proportional valuation method is 
also known as the "pure chance" or "percentage apportionment" method. See Boody, 106 F. 
Supp. at 1465. 
In a passage that courts have quoted widely, see, e.g., Borkowski v. Sacheti, 682 A.2d 
1095, 1101 {Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Smith, 616 So. 2d at 551; Kramer v. Lewisville Meml. 
Hosp., 858 S.W .2d 397, 402 {Tex. 1993), Professor King described the application of his pro­
portional valuation approach in a hypothetical case: 
[C]onsider a patient who suffers a heart attack and dies as a result. Assume that the 
defendant-physician negligently misdiagnosed the patient's condition, but that the pa­
tient would have had only a 40% chance of survival even with a timely diagnosis and 
proper care • . . .  Under the [proportional valuation method], the plaintiff's compensation 
for the loss of the victim's chance of surviving the heart attack would be 40% of the 
compensable value of the victim's life had he survived . . . .  
King, supra note 9, at 1382. 
66. See Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 615-16 (Ariz. 1984) (en 
bane); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 357 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510-11 {App. Div. 1974), affd., 374 
N.Y.S.2d 615 {1975). 
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lost chance tort injury. Section II.A contends that discretionary val­
uation allows factfinders to tailor the damages award to the actual 
losses arising out of the tort injury and that the proportional valua­
tion and full damages methods do not. Section II.B highlights other 
strengths of the discretionary method and shows how it avoids the 
problems that arise under other methods. 
A. Conceptual Nexus to the Tort Injury 
As the purpose of valuation is to "measur[ e] the loss that was 
caused by the tortious conduct,"67 the most important attribute of a 
method of valuing damages is the degree to which it correctly re­
flects the value of the plaintiff's compensable harm. Because courts 
and commentators have failed to analyze carefully the nature of the 
compensable harm in a lost chance case,68 they also have not as­
sessed the degree to which each of the three valuation methods re­
flects the value of the lost chance plaintiff's compensable harm. 
This section applies the framework developed in Part I to analyze 
the degree to which the damages calculations of the discretionary 
valuation, full damages, and proportional valuation methods reflect 
a lost chance plaintiff's compensable harms. 
The discretionary valuation method, if implemented with care­
fully worded jury instructions, carries the best chance for accurately 
valuing the plaintiff's tort injury. The inherent flexibility of discre­
tionary valuation, coupled with its focus on causation, allows the 
jury to consider all relevant evidence and make specific findings 
with respect to each element of damages for which the plaintiff 
claims a right to compensation. Guided by instructions that high­
light the distinction between the lost chance tort injury and the un­
derlying injury,69 the factfinder can isolate those losses that the 
defendant's negligence caused and compensate the plaintiff for 
67. King, supra note 9, at 1354. 
68. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
69. Although many observers have questioned the effectiveness of pattern jury instruc­
tions in guiding juries, see, e.g., AMlRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INsrnucnoNs UN­
DERSTANDABLE 1-24 (1982) (reviewing "empirical evidence which demonstrates that many of 
the jury instructions that are presently used around the country are incomprehensible to the 
average juror"), research suggests that carefully worded instructions can increase signifi­
cantly juries' comprehension of instructions, see, e.g., id. at 71 (asserting that "in most in­
stances [instructions developed using the authors' method] should ensure that jurors have a 
sufficient comprehension of the laws they are supposed to apply"); Jamison Wilcox, The Craft 
of Drafting Plain-Language Jury Instructions: A Study of a Sample Pattern Instruction on 
Obscenity, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1159, 1162 (1986) (contending that "recent advances can aid the 
average lawyer or judge to draft and evaluate jury instructions with successful attention to 
jurors' ability to understand them"). More important for the purposes of this Note, recent 
empirical evidence "offer[s] a significant challenge to the argument that legal professionals 
are more capable and consistent than juries in awarding noneconomic damages." Neil 
Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negli­
gence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 lowA L. REv. 883, 901 (1993). 
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them. Although the factfinder's discretionary valuation only esti­
mates the value of the tort injury rather than establishing or guar­
anteeing a particular "correct" result, this is true of any damages 
calculation in any tort case.70 Thus, because the discretionary 
method mandates a case-specific inquiry, the resulting valuation 
likely will more closely approximate the plaintiff's actual losses than 
either the full damages or proportional valuation methods. 
By contrast, the compensation awarded under the full damages 
approach does not correspond to the value of the lost chance plain­
tiff's tort injury - and the absence of any nexus is fatal to the ap­
proach's viability as a legitimate measure of damages in a lost 
chance case. Courts that award the prevailing plaintiff in a lost 
chance case the full value of all of the plaintiff's losses blatantly 
disregard the distinction between the tort injury and the ultimate 
harm.71 Awarding plaintiffs the full value of all of their losses is 
"too onerous for defendants . . .  [who] should not have to compen­
sate a plaintiff for the percentage of the harm they did not cause or 
that would have occurred naturally."72 Furthermore, "[t]o allow 
full recovery would ignore the claimants' inability to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the malpractice victim would 
have survived but for the malpractice, which is a requirement for 
full recovery."73 Courts that have allowed full recovery thus have 
failed to distinguish the tort injury from the underlying injury and 
have failed to apply the traditional test for causation74 to the re­
quested relief. 
The failure of proportional valuation to value accurately the lost 
chance tort injury is less obvious. Indeed, courts advocating pro­
portional valuation have claimed that proportional valuation "ap­
portions damages in direct relation to the harm caused . . .  [by] 
neither over compensat[ing] plaintiffs or unfairly burden[ing] de­
fendants with unattributable fault."75 Proponents of proportional 
valuation are certainly correct in asserting the superiority of the ap­
proach over alternatives that would compensate for the full value of 
70. See Vidmar & Rice, supra note 69, at 900-01. 
71. See Kevin Joseph Willging, Case Note, Falcon v. Memorial Hospital: A Rational Ap­
proach to Loss-of-Chance Tort Actions, 9 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTII L. & PoLY. 545, 553 (1993) 
(noting that courts presented with lost chance cases sometimes "fail[ ] to properly identify 
the injury sustained and have resorted to the practice of lowering the standard of proof re­
quired to prevail"). 
72. Boody v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (D. Kan. 1989). 
73. Smith v. State Dept. of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 547 (La. 1996). 
74. Under the traditional test, "[a]n act or an omission is not regarded as a cause of an 
event if the particular event would have occurred without it." KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, 
§ 41, at 265. The loss of chance doctrine applies only to cases in which the preexisting condi­
tion, more likely than the defendant's negligence, caused the ultimate harm. 
7�. Boody, 706 F. Supp. at 1466. But see infra section II.B.3 (arguing that the propor­
tional valuation metJiod loses much of its precision through problems of misapplication). 
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the underlying injury or that would deny recovery altogether. But 
arguments in favor of proportional valuation woefully lack an ade­
quate justification for the position that it accurately compensates 
the losses arising from a tort injury. Courts adopting proportional 
valuation have failed to demonstrate why the value of the plaintiff's 
lost chance of recovery is necessarily equal to some specific per­
centage of the value of the decedent's life. 
One would expect that the value of the lost chance to the de­
fendant would depend at least somewhat on case-specific factors for 
which the proportional valuation calculation does not account. Pro­
portional valuation looks only to the reduced probability of avoid­
ing injury and the value of the plaintiff's total injury.16 For 
example, the proportional valuation method values a loss of a ten­
percent chance of recovery equally, regardless of whether the loss 
of chance reduces the plaintiff's overall chance of recovery from 
forty percent to thirty percent or from ten percent to zero. The 
point is not that the plaintiff must value the reduction from forty 
percent to thirty percent differently from the reduction from ten 
percent to zero, but that the proportional valuation method simply 
assumes the victim attaches equal value to any ten-percent reduc­
tion in her chance of recovery - and therefore denies the possibil­
ity that the plaintiff does not equate the two reductions. 
Furthermore, distinct elements of the tort injury differ funda­
mentally from the traditional wrongful-death injury upon which the 
proportional valuation method is based.77 Consider, for example, 
emotional distress damages. Both a plaintiff's knowledge that she 
likely will die from her cancer and her knowledge that her doctor's 
negligent failure to diagnose the cancer has deprived her of a 
chance to survive almost certainly cause the plaintiff considerable 
emotional distress. If the plaintiff cannot show that the doctor's 
misdiagnosis, rather than the preexisting cancer, caused her failure 
to recover, then the doctor's liability should be limited to the emo­
tional distress that arose out of the misdiagnosis. But instead of 
focusing on that emotional distress, proportional valuation values 
the plaintiff's emotional distress by multiplying the lost chance of 
survival by the value of the plaintiff's overall emotional distress 
76. These factors might fit well within a system that proportionally allocates damages to 
the multiple potential causes of the plaintiff's underlying injury. Such a system, however, has 
never been recognized as the basis for allowing a loss of chance claim. Rather, damages 
awarded under the loss of chance doctrine should reflect the value of the physical, emotional, 
and consequential losses that the defendant's delayed diagnosis caused. See supra section 
I.B. 
77. Cf. Smith, 616 So. 2d at 548 ("The lost chance of survival in professional malpractice 
cases has a value in and of itself that is different from the value of a wrongful death or 
survival claim."). 
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arising out of her preexisting condition and her lost chance of 
survival. 
Similarly, medical expenses in a lost chance case should not be 
awarded based on a percentage of the medical expenses incurred in 
treating the plaintiff's preexisting condition. Instead, the principle 
of proximate causation requires that courts should award prevailing 
lost chance plaintiffs the value of any additional medical expenses 
incurred as a result of the defendant's negligence. If the defend­
ant's negligence necessitated additional medical treatment,78 then 
the defendant should be liable for the expenses associated with that 
treatment. But these expenses do not automatically equal the value 
calculated by multiplying the lost chance of recovering by the plain­
tiff's total medical expenses.19 
In sum, the discretionary valuation approach exhibits a closer 
conceptual nexus to the compensable tort injury in a lost chance 
case than do either the full damages approach or the proportional 
valuation approach. 
B. Implementation Issues 
The methods of calculating damages in lost chance cases differ 
markedly in how they are implemented, both in terms of their allo­
cation of responsibility between judge and factfinder and in their 
amenability to application in a manner consistent with their concep­
tual framework. This section argues that, in addition to the concep­
tual advantages of discretionary valuation discussed in section II.A, 
discretionary valuation reflects a more appropriate balance of 
responsibilities between the judge and factfinder than does propor­
tional valuation and is less susceptible to problems of mis­
application. Section II.B.1 asserts that discretionary valuation 
appropriately treats the lost chance damages calculation as an issue 
of fact and that proportional valuation infringes on the traditional 
domain of the factfinder by imposing a fixed damages calculation. 
Section II.B.2 examines the amount of guidance provided to the 
factfinder under discretionary valuation and concludes that, despite 
the claims of its critics, discretionary valuation provides adequate 
constraints on the factfinder's discretion. Section II.B.3 contends 
78. For example, delayed diagnosis of a patient's cancer may require doctors to attempt 
surgical removal of a tumor rather than chemotherapy treatment. 
79. The additional medical expenses caused by the defendant's negligence may be greater 
or less than the value calculated from the percentage chance lost and the total medical ex­
penses. As is the case with any of the potential components of tort injury, see supra section 
I.B (describing such components), the defendant's liability should extend only to cover those 
medical expenses that the plaintiff can prove resulted from the defendant's negligence; if the 
plaintiff cannot convince the factfinder that the defendant's negligence more likely than not 
caused an element of damages, then the plaintiff should not recover for those damages. 
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that courts are unable to implement proportional valuation without 
sacrificing its conceptual precepts. 
1. Consistency with Traditional Damages Valuation 
Of the methods of calculating damages in lost chance cases, the 
discretionary method best comports with traditional methods of de­
termining damages. The discretionary method properly recognizes 
that the assessment of damages in a tort case is, at its core, a factual 
issue properly left to the jury. Damages in lost chance cases are 
incapable of - and inappropriate for - resolution by a fixed legal 
principle other than the traditional requirement of causation. 
Determining compensation involves four types of decisions: (a) 
"fact:finding about the plaintiff's loss"; (b) "inferences or predic­
tions based on the established facts"; ( c) "translat[ion of] the plain­
tiff's injury into a dollar amount when that injury is not readily 
measured in monetary terms"; and ( d), "application of a legal 
rule."80 The first three categories of decisions primarily involve de­
termining issues of fact and thus fall within the province of the 
jury.s1 Case law firmly establishes this conclusion,82 which finds ad­
ditional support in historical, constitutional, and functional consid­
erations. 83 In particular, "[t]he jury brings the common sense and 
varied backgrounds of a group of individuals to thorny questions 
like the value of a plaintiff's pain and suffering. "84 By contrast, with 
respect to the fourth type of decision - application of a legal rule 
- neither constitutional85 nor functional considerations86 support 
jury involvement. 
Applying this analytical framework to lost chance cases yields 
the conclusion that courts should give juries the discretion to value 
80. Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative 
Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEXAS L. RE.v. 345, 357-58 (1995). 
81. See id. at 359. 
82. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (holding that the Seventh 
Amendment requires that "a jury properly determine . . .  the extent of the injury by an 
assessment of damages" because the assessment involves "questions of fact"); Kansas Mal­
practice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 258 (Kan. 1988) ("The determination of 
damages is an issue of fact. Therefore, it is the jury's responsibility to determine damages . • • •  
It would be illogical for this court to find that a jury, empaneled because monetary damages 
are sought, could not then fully determine the amount of damages suffered."); Etheridge v. 
Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989) ("Without question, the jury's fact-finding 
function extends to the assessment of damages."). 
83. See Murphy, supra note 80, at 360-61 (reviewing the "historical pedigree" of, and 
reasons for, juries determining questions of fact). 
84. Id. at 361-62. 
85. See Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal 
Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. RE.v. 723, 759-66 (1993) (asserting that Supreme Court doctrine 
does not require that legal rules be applied by juries). 
86. See id. at 736-39 (asserting that judges may be better able than juries to achieve con­
sistency and impartiality in applying legal rules). 
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the tort injury, as that calculation properly involves only the first 
three types of decisions and does not admit of resolution by a strict 
legal rule. Application of a legal rule in damages assessment is not 
appropriate "where no precise rule of law fixes the recoverable 
damages."87 The highly case-specific nature of the tort injury,88 
however, prevents any rigidly defined principle, established ex ante 
and prescribed in all cases, from accurately "fixing" a lost chance 
plaintiff's losses. The discretionary method avoids the imposition of 
a legal rule on what is a purely factual determination and thus al­
lows for individualized damage determinations that accurately re­
flect the loss that a particular lost chance plaintiff suffers. By 
contrast, the proportional valuation method applies a fixed mathe­
matical formula to all assessments of lost chance injuries, inappro­
priately imposing a legal principle on a factual issue, and thus 
encroaches upon the rightful domain of the jury.s9 
The recent Louisiana Supreme Court case of Smith v. State 
Department of Health and Hospitals,9° in which Louisiana adopted 
the discretionary method of damages valuation, provides a persua­
sive discussion of the merits of the discretionary method in this 
respect: 
The starting point of our analysis is to recognize that the loss of a less­
than-even chance of survival is a distinct injury compensable as gen­
eral damages which cannot be calculated with mathematical cer­
tainty . . . .  Rather, the jury in a loss of a chance of survival case merely 
considers the same evidence considered by a jury in a survival and 
wrongful death action, and the loss-of-chance jury then reaches its 
general damages award for that loss on that evidence as well as other 
relevant evidence in the record.91 
As the Louisiana court noted, discretionary valuation ensures that 
evaluations of loss of chance damages us� the same analysis, "based 
on all the evidence in the record, as is done for any other item of 
general damages."92 The discretionary method's flexibility thus al­
lows the factfinder to focus on the task of assessing the loss suffered 
by the plaintiff. 
87. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886). 
88. See supra section I.B. 
89. See supra note 82. Nothing in the discretionary method prevents a factfinder from 
finding that the plaintiff's damages are equal to the product of the percentage lost chance and 
the value of the underlying injury, but the discretionary method, unlike proportional valua­
tion, does not mandate as a matter of law that the factfinder so find. 
90. 676 So. 2d 543 (La. 1996). 
91. 676 So. 2d at 548-49. 
92. 676 So. 2d at 547; see also 616 So. 2d at 549 ("This is a valuation of the only damages 
at issue - the lost chance - which is based on all of the relevant evidence in the record, as is 
done for any other measurement of general damages."). 
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2. Guidance to Factfinder 
Critics of the discretionary method of damage valuation claim 
that the method fails to provide "meaningful guidance" to the 
factfinder,93 and most courts that have examined this approach 
have rejected it on the grounds that its lack of specific guidance 
impedes proper valuation of the plaintiff's injury.94 This argument 
undervalues the method's ability to constrain the factfinder's discre­
tion. Several factors limit the jury's discretion in assessing lost 
chance damages under the discretionary method. The discretionary 
method allows the jury "to consider an abundance of evidence and 
factors, including evidence of percentages of chance of survival 
along with evidence such as loss of support and loss of love and 
affection, and any other evidence bearing on the value of the lost 
chance,"95 but traditional safeguards protect against the possibility 
that the jury will make a serious mistake in weighing this evidence. 
Appellate courts can police for "speculative verdicts" by ensuring 
that the record contains evidence that supports the jury's verdict.96 
The discretionary method can offer proper guidance and avoid un­
fettered discretion through careful consideration of the evidence 
put before the jury, precisely worded instructions to the jury in­
structing it to tailor recovery to the losses that the defendant's neg­
ligence caused, and reevaluation of the evidentiary support for the 
jury's verdict on appeal.97 
93. See King, supra note 9, at 1381-82; see also Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 187 {Kan. 
1994) (criticizing the discretionary valuation approach as lacking precision); Reisig, supra 
note 10, at 1184 (same). 
94. See, e.g., Boody v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (D. Kan. 1989); Delaney, 
873 P.2d at 187. In Boody, the court criticized the discretionary valuation method: "While 
simple in formulation and fully allowing a decision maker to render justice, this rule is 
flawed. The decision maker needs some circumscription to properly evaluate the compensa­
tion necessary for the loss of a fractional right. The damages inquiry, when possible, should 
be more precise." Boody, 106 F. Supp. at 1465. In Delaney, the Kansas Supreme Court 
criticized the discretionary valuation method in similar terms: 
Under this method; the court or jury is left without instruction or guidance in ascertain­
ing the appropriate damage figure. Instead, the trier of fact is permitted to use its expe­
rience, judgment, and common sense in determining the appropriate value for the lost 
chance. Although this method is the simplest because the introduction of statistical evi­
dence is unnecessary, the goal of reaching some degree of precision in determining the 
loss allocation is lacking. 
Delaney, 873 P .2d at 187. 
95. Smith, 676 So. 2d at 549. 
96. See 676 So. 2d at 549. 
97. The case of James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980), provides an 
excellent example of how the discretionary method can appropriately constrain the 
factfinder's judgment by focusing on determining the losses caused by the defendant's negli­
gence. After identifying the physical and emotional losses that constituted James's tort in­
jury, the James court examined each type of damages claimed by James to determine if they 
had been caused by the hospital's negligence. The court held that James was not entitled to 
recover lost e�gs arising from the period of treatment for and recovery from his lung 
cancer, because "the proof is not sufficient to find that the government's negligence was a 
proximate cause (i.e., a substantial factor) in bringing about the condition which . • •  required 
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Moreover, despite the contrary claims of Professor King and 
others, the discretionary method is no less precise than proportional 
valuation; both methods substantially rely on subjective assess­
ments of the plaintiff's losses.98 The proportional valuation method 
as practiced by courts differs greatly from the precise analytical tool 
portrayed by the method's proponents.99 Proportional valuation 
does not avoid subjective assessments by the fact:finder but merely 
hides its subjectivity behind the veil of its "precise" mathematical 
formula.100 Because proportional valuation depends entirely on the 
factfinder's subjective assessment of the value of the plaintiff's un­
derlying injury, the discretionary method is no less subjective or less 
precise than proportional valuation. Use of an objectively con­
structed formula comprised ' of subjectively determined variables 
and coefficients "does not magically make [proportional valuation] 
more precise or more accurate than simply allowing the fact:finder 
to value directly the loss of a chance of survival that is the sole item 
of damages at issue in the case."101 
The discretionary method, far from relying on unconstrained 
subjective assessments, guides the fact:finder toward a more accu­
rate analysis by focusing the inquiry on the ultimate objective of 
[James] to stop work." 483 F. Supp. at 588. The court found that James's wife was not enti­
tled to compensation for loss of support, as "[p]laintiffs have failed to prove that defendant's 
negligence was the proximate cause of a measurable reduction in James's working life expec­
tancy." 483 F. Supp. at 588. Fmally, the court found that James's wife was not entitled to 
compensation for loss of consortium, because the plaintiffs had not proven a "complete loss 
of consortium for a definite period of time." 483 F. Supp. at 588. The court went on to note 
that "[i]n this case, moreover, the existence of the terminal illness appears to be the dominant 
cause of the impairment of the marital relationship, the impact of the government's negli­
gence being relatively insignificant." 483 F. Supp. at 588. 
98. The two approaches differ, of course, in that proportional valuation hides the 
factfinder's subjective valuation of the plaintiff's losses behind the veil of a fixed - and, this 
Note argues, overly rigid - formula for translating the factfinder's subjective assessments 
into the plaintiff's damages award. 
99. See infra section Il.B.3. 
100. As one federal district court deciding between the discretionary method and propor-
tional valuation observed: 
[w]hichever method is used, the decisionmaker must make a highly subjective decision. 
In the [discretionary valuation] method . . .  the decisionmaker must make the subjective 
decision of what amount of money would fully compensate the plaintiff for her injuries. 
The [proportional valuation] approach requires the decisionmaker to make the subjec­
tive decision of allotting a monetary amount for the value of plaintiff's life . . . .  ['The 
proportional valuation] approach basically involves a subjective judgment being mathe­
matically discounted. We are unconvinced that the mathematical discounting of the sub­
jective value of human life somehow makes that approach any more precise and more 
accurate than the approach we have chosen. 
Borgren v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 581, 583 (D. Kan. 1989); see also KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 1, § 127, at 953 {observing that the process of damages determination in a wrong­
ful death case "necessarily involves a large element of speculation, turning on such matters as 
life expectancy, income, habits and health of the deceased, past contributions to his family, 
the probability of increased earnings and contributions in the future, and, in some jurisdic­
tions, the probability of future inflation"). 
101. Smith, 676 So. 2d at 548. 
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damages assessment - compensating the losses caused by the de­
fendant's negligence - rather than offering a rigid mathematical 
formula. 
3. Mathematical Formalism, Oversimplification, and Other 
Problems of Misapplication 
This section argues that proportional valuation is inherently 
prone to misapplication in ways that discretionary valuation is not. 
Although commentators and courts sing its praises over discretion­
ary valuation,102 the proportional valuation method is alternatively 
a crude measure of the loss suffered in a lost chance case or too 
complex for practical application. 
Perhaps the most compelling argument against the proportional 
valuation method comes from the cases that have attempted to ap­
ply the method. Courts applying pr.oportional valuation routinely 
apply it to all of the losses suffered by the plaintiff; no damages are 
calculated outside of that method.103 Yet clearly some of the conse­
quences of the tort injury - for example, increased pain and suffer­
ing - are �ntirely the result of the defendant's negligence and 
should not be discounted by the proportional valuation calculation. 
Put simply, the proportional valuation method errs fundamentally 
in "its rigid use of a precise mathematical formula, based on impre­
cise percentage chance estimates applied to estimates of general 
damages that never occurred, to arrive at a figure for an item of 
general damages that this court has long recognized cannot be cal­
culated with mathematical precision."104 
Furthermore, courts applying proportional valuation virtually 
exclusively have used what Professor King refers to as "the single­
outcome method," whereby the court values the tort injury based 
on the lost chance of complete recovery.105 Any medical malprac­
tjce case involves multiple possible outcomes, however, ranging 
102. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 94; King supra note 9, at 1381-82; Reisig, supra note 
10, at 1183. 
103. See, e.g., Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 57 (Mich. 1990); Perez v. Las 
Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 592 (Nev. 1991). 
104. Smith, 616 So. 2d at 548. The Louisiana court's statement calls to mind the criticism 
that co=entators have leveled at another damages calculation method that similarly relies 
heavily on mathematical calculation - the "per diem" method of calculating pain-and·suffer­
ing damages. See Geistfeld, supra note 59, at 782. Juries in jurisdictions that use the per 
diem method are asked to determine the value of one day of pain and suffering by the plain­
tiff, and then multiply that value by the length of time that the plaintiff has experienced or 
will experience such pain and suffering. See id. A number of courts and co=entators have 
criticized the method, noting that "by lending a quantitative component to the damages cal­
culation, it 'lend[s) a false air of certainty to an area where none exists.' " Id. (quoting James 
0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Per Diem or Similar Mathematical Basis for Fixing Damages for 
Pain and Suffering, 3 A.L.R.4TH 940, 945 (1981)). 
105. See King, supra note 9, at 1384. 
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from complete recovery to death.106 Thus, to reflect these multiple 
potential outcomes effectively in a proportional valuation calcula­
tion, the factfinder must identify each possible outcome and the 
probability of occurrence associated with each, a process that Pro­
fessor King labels an "expected value" or "weighted mean" calcula­
tion.101 Single-outcome proportional valuation obscures this factual 
complexity and thus significantly undercutsJthe precision so lauded 
by proportional valuation's proponents. 
On the other hand, as King admits, the complexity of the 
expected-value calculation is potentially staggering, as it "could in­
volve a virtually unlimited number of permutations that would have 
to be weighted before they could be aggregated to arrive at the 
value of the chance. "10s The fact that courts adopting proportional 
valuation overwhelmingly have utilized the single-outcome ap­
proach would appear to indicate either that they perceive the com­
plexity of the expected-outcome approach as overwhelming or that 
they fail to understand the full complexity of the tort injury. 
One might argue that courts' frequent misapplication of propor­
tional valuation does not limit its theoretical advantages over other 
methods.109 The costs of abusing a technique, however, must be 
reckoned among the costs of using it at all to the extent that the 
latter creates risks of the former. As noted by Professor Tribe, 
in at least some contexts, permitting any use of certain mathematical 
methods entails a sufficiently high risk of misuse, or a risk of misuse 
sufficiently costly to avoid, that it would be irrational not to take such 
misuse into account when deciding whether to permit the methods to 
be employed at all.110 
106. Tue timing of the onset of these outcomes may also be uncertain. For example, King 
offers the example of a situation in which "as a result of [an] accident there is a 25% chance 
of the onset of injury-induced blindness occurring at fifty years of age, a 4% chance at forty, a 
1 % chance at thirty, and a 70% chance that such blindness would never result" Id. Thus, a 
truly accurate proportional valuation calculation must take into account not only the possibil­
ity of outcomes other than death or full recovery but also the temporal dispersion of each of 
these outcomes. See id. 
107. See id. Professor King actually understates the complexity of a truly sophisticated 
weighted-mean calculation, in that his discussion notes only the multiple possible outcomes 
and their corresponding probabilities of occurrence after the defendant's negligence has 
taken place. King fails to recognize that in order to isolate the effects of the defendant's 
negligence, a weighted-mean calculation also must consider the multiple outcomes and corre­
sponding probabilities that the preexisting condition would have caused in the absence of the 
defendant's negligence. A sophisticated proportional valuation calculation would require the 
factfinder to determine the change in the probability caused by the defendant's negligence 
for each outcome, multiply this number by the value of the total loss associated with each 
outcome, and then sum these values over all the potential outcomes. 
108. Id. 
109. But see supra sections II.A & II.B (arguing that these theoretical advantages do not 
exist). 
110. Laurence H. 'fribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 
84 HAR.v. L. REv. 1329, 1331 (1971). 
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Aside from the fact that mathematical formulae do not enable 
courts to calculate accurately the value of a tort injury, the propor­
tional valuation method also is plagued by its reduction of the tradi­
tionally subjective valuation process to a rigid mathematical 
calculation. The use of mathematical formulae or schedules for 
computing damages in tort cases has long been rejected by 
courts.111 As Professor Tribe has noted, 
although the mathematical or pseudo-mathematical devices which a 
society embraces to rationalize its systems for adjudication may be 
quite comprehensible to a student of that society's customs and cul­
ture, those devices may nonetheless operate to distort - and, in some 
instances, to destroy - important values which that society means to 
express or to pursue through' the conduct of legal tria1s.112 
By imposing a one-size-fits-all formula on every lost chance case to 
which it is applied, proportional valuation deprives the factfinder of 
the flexibility to weigh the impact of the tort injury on the individ­
ual plaintiff. Thus, application of proportional valuation inevitably 
results in a quagmire of practical problems. 
The discretionary valuation method is superior - both in 
theory and in practice - to the proportional valuation and full 
damages methods. The discretionary method is not without its limi­
tations; the method depends on careful guidance by courts and 
thoughtful implementation by factfinders. But its advantages over 
the proportional valuation and full damages method are clear. The 
lack of nexus between the damages calculation of the full damages 
method and the value of the lost chance tort injury exposes that 
method's gross inadequacy. The proportional valuation method 
suffers from two fundamental flaws. First, the method lacks accu­
racy; damages assessed by the method lack a clear nexus to the 
plaintiff's losses. Second, the method lacks precision; in practice, 
courts purporting to adopt proportional valuation apply a crude ap­
proximation of Professor King's theory. Moreover, increasing the 
method's precision to a suitable level would cause it to become so 
administratively cumbersome as to be unworkable. The short­
comings of proportional valuation - both as conceived and as ap­
plied - render the method's result a crude measure of the actual 
harm suffered, preventing the proportional valuation method from 
fulfilling the expectations of its advocates and highlighting the need 
for discretionary valuation's more flexible approach to damages 
valuation in lost chance cases. Only discretionary valuation allows 
the factfinder to tailor the plaintiff's recovery to the compensable 
harm suffered in a particular case. 
111. See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 59, at 810-11 (noting "[j]udicial resistance to the use 
of [mathematical] formulas" in valuing pain-and-suffering damages). 
112. Tribe, supra note 110, at 1330. 
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CONCLUSION 
Courts and commentators have debated vigorously the advan­
tages and disadvantages of allowing recovery for a lost chance of 
survival. Ultimately, the worth of the lost chance doctrine should 
be determined by evaluating its ability to accomplish the tort objec­
tives of deterrence, compensation, and corrective justice in the 
unique context of the lost chance factual scenario. The chaotic 
state of the doctrine currently limits the ability of the doctrine to 
address these needs effectively. Courts faced with lost chance cases 
reflect this confusion with inconsistent and ill-reasoned applications 
of the doctrine. 
Much of this confusion could be alleviated by a clear and careful 
analysis of the tort injury, an analysis that focuses on making a case­
specific, fact-intensive determination of the losses suffered by the 
plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligence. In particular, 
courts must clearly distinguish the tort injury from the losses associ­
ated with the plaintiff's underlying injury. Courts valuing damages 
in lost chance cases should adopt the discretionary method of valua­
tion, which allows the fact:finder the flexibility to evaluate the plain­
tiff's losses by assessing all of the available evidence. 
